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1 Introduction
The recent turbulence in global financial markets has brought into sharp relief
the issue of how lenders price default risk on loans. This is particularly true
in the context of mortgage markets where different segments of the market
face different prospects of repaying their loans. In spite of its manifest
importance, there are few empirical studies that study this issue.
This paper investigates risk pricing of U.K. mortgage contracts over 30
years using a unique data set on more than 600,000 mortgage contracts. It
is well-known that the law of one price does not hold in credit markets. To
motivate this observation in the context of this paper, figure 1 gives the
interest rate spread charged to mortgage borrowers from our data which
we describe in details in the next section. The left panel illustrates the
distribution of individual interest rate spreads which we have normalized to
have mean zero. It is evident from this that there is considerable dispersion
to explain in the way that borrowers are treated. But this is put into
context by looking also at the right panel which gives the estimated density
of a normalized loan size variable from our data. Not surprisingly, there is
also a distribution of loan sizes. However, notice that there is considerably
less dispersion in the latter distribution compared to interest rates suggesting
that there is a potentially important source of heterogeneity which is driving
interest rate dispersion that is not captured in loan size.1
Our primary focus in this paper is on understanding the relationship be-
tween the interest rate and loan size, namely the shape of the (inverse) credit
supply function. We will pursue a quantile regression approach in which the
non-linear relationship between the interest rate charged to borrowers and
loan size is influenced by unobserved heterogeneity (controlling for observed
borrower characteristics), which we interpret as risk.
As well as allowing for potential non-linearities, we also consider the pos-
sibility that the demand for credit responds endogenously to the terms offered
by the lender. To disentangle supply and demand factors, we propose using
variations in tax rates on housing transactions as an instrument for credit
demand. This exploits the fact that these tax rates, which depend upon the
value of the house purchased, vary over time and across borrowers. Our ap-
proach is therefore in the spirit of Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) who
1The dispersion of income and housing wealth are also far smaller than the dispersion
of the interest rate.
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exploit exogenous changes in the tax system on income to identify labour
supply. To implement this, we employ the Instrumental Variable Quantile
Regression estimator proposed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005).
The results demonstrate that there is a good deal of heterogeneity in
the pricing of risk and that a non-linear approach is essential to capture
features of the data that would be missed by looking only at the average
relationship between the loan size and interest rate. After treating loan size
as endogenous, risk pricing is even more pronounced in the upper quantiles of
the interest rate spread distribution conditional on covariates. A 1% increase
in loan size triggers a 60 basis points rise in the interest rate charged to the
riskiest borrowers in our sample, but it has small or insignificant impact on
the interest rate charged to the safest borrowers. This should be contrasted
with an average effect of 30 basis points estimated using least squares.
The existing literature on mortgage pricing has long been interested in
risk heterogeneity. The contingent-claim approach, pursued for instance
by Kau and Keenan (1995) and Deng et al. (2002), uses option pricing
theory to explain default and prepayment behaviors while the intensity-form
approach, taken by Chiang, Chow and Liu (2002) and Tsai, Liao and Chiang
(2009) among others, investigates the link between termination probability,
borrower’s characteristics and mortgage risk premia. Our micro-data on
mortgage contracts makes it possible to look at some of the basic facts on
risk pricing while remaining agnostic about the exact underlying theoretical
model. In light of recent issues, a recent strand of work, exemplified by Mian
and Sufi (2009) and Keys et al. (2009), focuses on the role of securitization
and credit expansion in the U.S. sub-prime crisis. While our data span a
longer period of time, our focus on the extent of risk pricing clearly feeds
into wider debates about the mortgage market.
We join a growing empirical literature that exploits an instrumental vari-
able quantile regression approach to study heterogeneity in micro-data. Promi-
nent examples are the analysis in Chernozhukov and Hansen (2004) to quan-
tify the effects of retirement programs on saving, the work of Abadie et al.
(2002) to estimate the returns on education and the study by Garcia, Hernan-
dez and Lopez-Nicolas (2001) to investigate the sources of wage inequality.
Risk heterogeneity in mortgage pricing is a very natural context in which to
apply this approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we set the scene for the empirical investigation by describing the data and
key features of the U.K. mortgage market. In section three, we look at some
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empirical regularities in the raw data. Section four sets out the concep-
tual framework and empirical approach. Section five presents the empirical
results, while section six concludes. The appendices report additional infor-
mation on the data and the institutional background of the U.K. mortgage
market together with a simple model of loan pricing.
2 Context and Data
Our core data are a sample of more than 600,000 mortgage contracts issued
in the U.K. between 1975 and 2005. The data come from the U.K. Survey
of Mortgage Lenders (SML) and its predecessor, the 5% Sample Survey of
Building Society Mortgages (SBSM).2 This survey includes characteristics
of the loan at origination such as the loan size, purchase price, and the rate of
interest charged. It also includes borrower characteristics such as the age of
the main borrower, total household income on which the mortgage advance
is based, the previous tenure of the household, and the region in which the
house is purchased. Previous tenure status includes information on whether a
borrower is a “first time buyer”, i.e. has any prior track record as a mortgage
borrower. The data does not, however, contain any information credit scores
nor do we know whether and how such scores are used by different lenders.
One possible interpretation of the risk heterogeneity that we discuss below
is therefore the risk assessment by the lender based on a credit score. The
surveys that we use only covers mortgage contracts where the property is
to be occupied by the borrower (so they exclude investment and buy-to-let
properties). The sample that we use is further restricted to observations
where the mortgage is defined as being for house purchase.
Most mortgage products in the U.K. are adjustable rate mortgages that
move in line with the funding costs of the lender with the main trigger event
for changes being movements in Bank Rate set by the Bank of England.
Fixed rate mortgages, which have become more prevalent in recent years,
are typically fixed for only two years and then revert to an adjustable rate.
Almost all of the mortgages in our dataset are ‘variable’ rate products with
terms of approximately 25 years. Mortgages are secured on the property
for the which the funds are advanced. In the U.K., the lender is able to
2The switch between the SBSM and the SML reflects the changing institutional nature
of the UK mortgage market.
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possess the property in the event of default and can pursue the borrower for
any shortfall in the amount recovered.
Mortgages in our data are issued by banks and specialist mortgage lenders
called Building Societies. Prior to the 1980s, the UK mortgage market
was dominated by a cartel structure of regional Building Societies protected
from banking sector competition by legislation and deliberate policies that
restricted Banks’ involvement in the mortgage market. From that point
on, financial liberalisation measures resulted in greater competition from the
banking sector and other specialist lenders. It also resulted in market con-
solidation and the widening of the range of funding options available to all
lenders.3 Greater competition induced a proliferation of mortgage prod-
ucts (to over 13,000 by 2007) and greater variation in rates between lenders.
For example, the Building Societies Association’s recommended mortgage
rate, which had been in existence since 1939, broke down in 1984. Lenders
have also found ways of harnessing information on potential borrowers. No-
table developments include the introduction (in 1982) and greater use (in the
1990s) of credit scoring techniques.
Quantities that institutions have been willing to lend have evolved over
time in part in response to rule changes affecting mortgage lenders. For
example, Building Societies were previously restricted in terms of the pro-
portion of their loan book that could be constructed of larger loan advances
(deemed ‘special advances’) in order to lower risk exposure of mortgage port-
folios to relatively few large loans. Such restrictions and building societies
mutual status resulted in relatively low loan-to-value ratios (or required sin-
gle premium insurance indemnity to limit their risk to higher advances) and
loan-to-income ratios.4 However, over time such lending limits have been re-
3The Building Societies Act (1986) relaxed rules on Building Societies provision of
services and sources of funds. Building Societies were allowed to access wholesale markets
for up to 20% of their funding, a limit that has been steadily increased. Demutualisations
and consolidations resulted in the number of Building Societies falling rapidly from 382
in 1975 to just 52 in 2009. Appendix A provides additional information on market
liberalisation and demutualisations.
4Mortgage indemnity insurance has been offered on U.K. mortgages, allowing lenders to
insure against future collateral losses. When lenders take out this insurance it is typically
passed onto borrowers through additional mortgage arrangement fees. Such mortgage
indemnity insurance is not compulsory in the U.K., with no equivalent to U.S. public
insurance funds, and the effect may be lessened by legislation ensuring that borrowers
remain liable for mortgage shortfalls for up to 12 years. Over our sample period, both
mortgage indemnity insurance and pursuit of mortgage shortfalls has had limited take-up.
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laxed as we discuss further below. In our empirical analysis, we will treat
these broad changes in the structure of mortgage markets as ”macro-effects”,
which justify the use of year dummies in our empirical specification. As we
discuss further in our concluding comments, an interesting focus for future
research is to study time variation in mortgage pricing in a more flexible way.
We supplement the micro-data from our mortgage surveys with informa-
tion on regional house price levels from the Nationwide house price index,
and regional claimant count unemployment rates.5 To benchmark individual
borrowing rates against a funding rate, we compute the interest rate spread
faced by borrowers over the Building Societies Associations’ recommended
deposit rate prior to 1985, and an average reported building society share
(deposit) rate subsequently.6
We turn finally to the stamp duty rate which we will propose as an in-
strument for credit demand below. Stamp duty is the tax paid on housing
transactions in the U.K.. It has a long history having originally been ap-
plied to transactions of vellum, parchment and paper in 1694 to pay for the
war with France. Its success saw its extension (despite the role of the 1765
Stamp Act in the movement for U.S. Independence) with housing transac-
tions incorporated by 1808. Today, stamp duty is levied on UK housing
and land transactions at varying rates with a band and rate structure. The
thresholds to these bands and the rates themselves have shown considerable
variation over time, as demonstrated in table 1 and figure 2. Thus, there
have been a number of changes in stamp duty over time and across sizes of
housing transactions which we can exploit. Figure 3 gives a histogram of
actual stamp duty rates paid. A significant proportion of the rates observed
in the sample are either in the 1% band or below the lowest stamp duty
threshold. Over 60% of property transactions in our dataset are liable for
the tax.
5The Office for National Statistics report monthly rates for twelve geographical regions:
Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and nine Government Office Regions within England.
The English regions are: North East, North West, Yorkshire and the Humber, East Mid-
lands, West Midlands, East of England, London, South East and South West.
6The use of building societies deposit rates as a benchmark reflects the fact that retail
deposits remain the main source of funds for the building society sector.
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3 Empirical Regularities
Before we present regressions results, we explore some basic facts in the raw
data. Table 2 begins with some key summary statistics from the micro-data
on mortgage contracts. We report these for the full sample as well as ten
year windows.7 Given our interest in heterogeneity, we report, the mean,
median, standard deviation, skewness and coefficient of variation. The latter
offers a straightforward way of comparing dispersion in key variables.
The first panel looks at the interest rate spread; measured as the contract
rate less the funding rate described in the last section. Two striking findings
emerge. First, there has been a decline in this spread – it reaches its lowest
value over the most recent past.8 Second, the skew of the interest rate spread
distribution has steadily increased over time moving from a negative value in
the first period to a positive value in the second period, and then doubling
over the latest ten year period. The coefficient of variation increases steadily
over time.
The second panel looks at the loan size in real terms. In view of the
reduction in the interest rate spread, the doubling in real loan size could be
interpreted either as a demand or a supply effect. There is also an increase in
dispersion, but this is less than the increase in the interest rate dispersion.
Two important background factors behind these changes are increases in
real incomes and housing values. They are reported in panels three and
four of table 2. The period of our data have seen increases in both the real
incomes of house purchasers and house prices. Dispersion in the incomes of
house purchases and house prices have also increased.
Finally in the fourth and fifth panels of Table 2, we report data on the loan
to income and loan to value ratio. The loan to income ratio increases over
time from 1.9 to 2.5 and the rise in the dispersion is modest. Looking at loan
to value ratios, the increase is even less pronounced while dispersion actually
falls. An implication of this is that the proportion of housing wealth among
those taking out new mortgage loans has generally kept pace with increases
in house prices.
7Appendix B provides additional information on the construction of the dataset.
8We note that comparing across funding rate definitions is difficult, providing additional
justification for the use of year dummy variables.
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4 Conceptual Framework and Empirical Ap-
proach
Our objective is to understand how the interest rate charged to borrowers
depends on the amount that he/she borrows and his/her observed character-
istics. We will interpret this as the inverse of a credit supply function which
we expect to be an increasing function of the loan size, other things being
equal: borrowing more means a lower probability of repayment and a higher
risk premium being charged. Appendix C spells out a simple mortgage
pricing model to motivate this.
More precisely, suppose that borrower i in region r at date t is character-
ized by observable characteristics Xirt and a scalar index of riskiness, Uirt,
which we assume to be observed by the lender but not by us. This variable
could represent the result of a credit scoring algorithm or the lender observ-
ing a variable like occupation or work history which we do not have in our
data. We will treat Uirt as the key source of unobserved heterogeneity. The
(inverse) credit supply function is denoted by:
Rirt = H (Lirt;Drt, Xirt, Uirt) (1)
where Rirt is the interest rate relative to the funding rate, Drt are macro
covariates which shift the supply function around and Lirt is the amount
borrowed. This gives the interest rate spread faced by an individual who
chooses to borrow L given a vector of characteristics (D,X,U).
Our aim is to estimate the shape of (1) using quantile regression (QR).
Above all, this will not assume that the relationship between the amount
borrowed, characteristics and the interest rate is linear. We will, however,
initially assume that Lirt is exogenous. The QR approach treats the interest
rate spread as a potential latent outcome. It is latent because, given a
loan size, Lirt, other observable individual characteristics, Xirt, and macro
covariates Drt, the observed outcome for each unit of observation i is only
one of the possible realizations in the admissible space of outcomes. The
quantiles, Qτ , of the potential outcome distributions conditional on covariates
are denoted by:
Qτ (Rirt|Lirt, Drt, Xirt) with τ ∈ (0, 1). (2)
The effect of a change in loan size, Lirt (the “treatment”), on different points
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of the marginal distribution of the potential outcome is given by:
QTEτ =
∂Qτ (Rirt|L,Drt, Xirt)
∂L
(3)
The quantile treatment model can then be written as:
Rirt = q (Lirt, Drt, Xirt, Uirt) where Uirt|Lirt ∼ U (0, 1) . (4)
In this notation, q (Lirt, Drt, Xirt, Uirt) = Qτ (Rirt|Lirt, Drt, Xirt). In effect,
we can always work with a suitable monotonic transformation of the under-
lying measure of riskiness such that Uirt is a rank variable, i.e. it measures
the relative ranking of individuals in terms of potential outcomes. According
to this interpretation, QTEτ measures the causal effect of loan size on the
interest rate spread, holding the degree of riskiness fixed at Uirt = τ .
Since we are treating loan size, Lirt, as exogenous, the methods outlined
in Koenker and Bassett (1968) can be used to estimate quantile effects on
the basis of the conditional moment restrictions:
Prob[R ≤ q (L,D,X, τ) |L, x] = Prob[U ≤ τ |L,D,X] = τ for each τ ∈ (0, 1).
This permits us to explore the shape of the relationship between loan size and
interest rate spread using (1). The empirical specification of the conditional
τ -th quantile distribution takes the following form:
Qτ (Rirt|·) = aL (τ)Lirt + ax (τ)Xirt + aD (τ)Drt. (5)
The variable Lirt is the log of the real loan size. The vector Xirt includes log
of household real income, initial real housing wealth, age of the household
head and a dummy variable that takes the value one if the household head
is a first time buyer and zero otherwise. The vector Drt includes regional
and year dummy variables as well as a regional house price index and the
regional unemployment rate measured by the claimant count in the quarter
before the mortgage contract was agreed.
Supposing that Lirt is exogenous is not satisfactory. Perhaps the most
plausible justification would be to suppose that it varies solely with tastes
for housing which are uncorrelated with the vector (D,X,U). But to the
extent that households know that a lender is treating them more or less
favorably, they may change the amount that they choose to borrow creating
an endogeneity problem.
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We can close the model by supposing that the borrower picks a loan size
given the credit supply function that he faces and his taste for housing. Let
W (L,R, ·) be the expected life time payoff from borrowing an amount L at
interest spread R. Then the optimal choice of loan is:
Lirt = Lˆ (Drt, Xirt, Uirt, Zirt, Virt)
= argmax {W (L,R (L,Drt, Xirt, Uirt) , Drt, Xirt, Zirt, Virt)} .
The variable Zirt denotes an additional observable that affects loan choice –
the instrument in our approach. The variable Virt is an unobserved compo-
nent which we interpret as the taste for housing.
We will discuss below the particular instrument that we have in mind.
Given this, we can exploit the IVQR model of Chernozhukov and Hansen
(2005). Our observables are now (Rirt, Lirt, Xirt, Zirt). For the IVQR model:
Rirt = q (Lirt, Xirt, Drt, Uirt) where Uirt|Zirt ∼ U (0, 1) (6)
where
Prob[R ≤ q (L,D,X, τ) |Z,X] = Prob[U ≤ τ |Z,D,X] = τ for each τ ∈ (0, 1).
In particular, we require that, given (Drt, Xirt), then {Uirt} is distributed
independently of Zirt. For some random vector, Σ, we also require that:
Lirt = Lˆ (Xirt, Drt, Zirt,Σirt)
where Σirt = (Virt, Uirt) in our context.
An important and non-standard requirement relative to standard in-
strumental variables is the rank similarity condition which says that given
(Xirt, Drt, Zirt,Σirt) , the distribution of Uirt does not vary systematically
with Lirt. This will hold as long as the direct dependence of Lirt on Uirt is
sufficiently weak. We will now argue that this is plausible given the approach
that we propose.
The instrument we use is the stamp duty rate which depends on the
house price paid by a borrower which we denoted by P. We denote the rules
governing stamp duty as S (P ; ξt) – a piecewise linear function which depends
on a set of time-varying policy rules denoted by ξt. The price paid for a
house is the sum of initial housing wealth and the size of the loan, i.e.
Pirt = Wirt + Lirt.
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Our proposed instrument is therefore implicitly defined from:
Zirt = S
(
Wirt + Lˆ (Drt, Xirt, Uirt, Zirt, Virt) ; ξt
)
.
As we have already noted, the validity of Zirt as instrument hinges on vari-
ation in Zirt being driven by underlying variation in (ξt, Virt) conditional on
(Drt, Xirt) , recalling that Wirt is part of the vector Xirt. This requires that
changes in tax rules and unobserved preferences for housing should be re-
sponsible for variations in tax rates across individuals and over time rather
than variation in Uirt. In fact, we adopt a conservative approach by dropping
households who are within +/-5% (by value) of the stamp duty thresholds.
It is only amongst individuals who are close to the threshold where we would
expect variations in Uirt to be correlated with Zirt.
9 Thus we are confident
that variations in (ξt, Virt) are inducing variation in Zirt.
Further credence is given to this view by observing that variation in stamp
duty rates paid depends significantly on region reflecting disparities in re-
gional house prices: average London house prices in our sample are over
1.7 times higher than those in Northern Ireland, and London has a greater
proportion of observations in our dataset. This motivates the addition of re-
gional house price, as well as regional unemployment claimant count rate, as
covariates in our empirical specification. Furthermore, we also condition on
regional dummies in an effort to control for other regional features unrelated
to loan pricing. Figure 4 illustrates the extent of geographical dispersions
as captured by real house prices and claimant count unemployment rate for
each region.
This gives a “first stage” equation explaining the amount borrowed:
Lirt = bSZirt + bXXirt + bDDrt + ηirt (7)
where Xrit is the same vector of observed household characteristics as above
and Drt are the same regional and time-varying regional variables as in equa-
tion (5).
Results from estimating (7) are presented in Table 3. The first column
uses the baseline sample which drops observations which are within +/-5%
9Nearly 13% of our sample lies within +/-5% of the stamp duty thresholds. As a
robustness check we also tested a sample where only observations within the 5% below
stamp duty thresholds were dropped without materially altering our results. Results from
a sensitivity analysis where we do not trim the data around the stamp duty thresholds are
discussed at the end of section 4.
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of any of the stamp duty thresholds. This will be the sample which we use
when we present results for the credit supply relation below and hence it is
our actual first stage regression. After controlling for observed individual
characteristics, regional features and year dummies, the rate of stamp duty
is positively correlated with loan size. A 1% increase in stamp duty rate is
associated with a significant change in the (log) level of real loan of around
0.229. This coefficient corresponds to a change in nominal loan demand of
£2,332 in 2005.10
The second column presents the same regression results where we exploit
only the variation in stamp duty rates across regions and years (but not across
individuals). This is important as it tells us how much of the identification
is coming from ξt, the changes in stamp duty rules. Again, the stamp duty
rate is positive and significant which reassures us that stamp duty rules are
giving us an important source of exogenous variation. Finally, for the sake
of comparison only, we give the results from estimating the regression in
column 1 on the full sample, i.e. without trimming the data around stamp
duty thresholds. As can be seen the results are broadly similar to those in
the first column.
5 Results
In this section, we present our main results in two parts. First, we contrast
the estimated average effects for the whole sample with the estimated effects
for each quantile. Second, we assess the extent to which treating loan size as
endogenous affects the results.
5.1 The interest rate and loan size
In Figure 5, we present the estimates (and the 95% confidence intervals) of
the coefficient on loan in a QR equation of the form (5).11 To emphasise the
10The first stage F-statistics, which Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) advocate as a useful
rule of thumb to assess an instrument strength, largely exceeds the value of 10, implying
that when we move to the second stage inference in the IV approach below, this appears
reliable under both the relative bias and the size criteria defined in Stock and Yogo (2001).
We note that the first stage F-statistics exceed the value of 10 even when we assess the
instrument strength in each quantile separately.
11Confidence bands are estimated using the method for heteroskedasticity consistent
standard errors described in Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005).
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importance of risk heterogeneity, we compare these results with the estimates
(and the 95% confidence intervals) from using OLS which are given by the
dotted line.
The results show strong evidence of heterogeneity in the conditional inter-
est rate spread distribution with respect to real loan size. The semi-elasticity
of spread with respect loan size for borrowers below the 70th percentile is
around 0.01. By contrast, borrowers in the upper tail of the conditional dis-
tribution face a significantly steeper curve with a slopes of up to 0.08 in the
top quantiles. This pattern makes economic sense with those taking out
comparatively smaller loans paying a small interest rate premium compared
to a much steeper relationship for higher quantiles.
It is clear in particular how the OLS gives a misleading picture. Accord-
ing to the OLS results, a 1% increase in the size of the real loan is associated
with an interest rate spread which is 6 basis points higher irrespective of the
borrower’s position in the conditional distribution. This, understates the
effect at higher quantiles and overstates it at lower quantiles.
We turn next to the IVQR results which are reported in figure 6 as the red
line with asterisks. For the sake of comparison, we also report estimates and
confidence intervals for the QR method of figure 5 and a standard two-stage
least squares (TSLS) estimator (the dotted blue line).
The comparison between the IVQR and the TSLS estimates echo the
results from Figure 5. There is strong evidence of heterogeneity with the
least squares approach failing to account for different slopes along the credit
supply relationship. The point estimate for the average effect of around
30 basis point response following a 1% increase in the loan size should be
compared with a response which is small or not significantly different from
zero in the lower quantiles while it is larger than 50 basis points at the upper
quantiles.
The comparison between the IVQR and the QR estimators gives a sense
of the potential importance of endogeneity bias across households. In this
respect, two features of the comparison between the solid and the asterisked
lines are worth emphasizing. First, the IV and non-IV methods deliver esti-
mates quantitatively similar up to the 30th percentile. Above that, however,
a borrower who is ranked higher in the riskiness distribution (as measured
by higher conditional interest rate spreads) seems to exhibit a greater en-
dogeneity bias. There is little evidence of bias in the QR estimates for the
safest borrowers. This is plausible since loan size is unlikely to be influenced
by the lender’s risk pricing when the risk of default is small. The bias for the
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riskiest borrowers appears, however, to be sizeable. The latter is precisely
where we would expect a non-trivial interaction between loan demand and
the lender’s risk pricing behavior.12 Thus, the results in this section make
theoretical sense. Second, according to the IVQR estimates, the borrowers
with the highest conditional interest rate spread are charged an additional
60 basis points for every 1% increase in their loan demand. This number is
only 8 basis points according to the standard QR method.
5.2 Individual characteristics
Our empirical methods also allow us to look at how other elements of Xirt
affect the mortgage spread charged conditional on Lirt. In figure 7, we
report results for housing wealth, income, age and whether the borrower is
a first-time-buyer. In each case, the solid line and grey area (the asterisked
line and the shaded pink area) represent IVQR (QR) estimates. The results
from TSLS are reported as dotted lines.
For income and age, figure 7 finds, in line with the previous charts, that
there is heterogeneity in the endogeneity bias. This is seen by observing that
the divergence between the solid and asterisked lines becomes larger and is
significant at the upper tail of the conditional distribution. The estimates
based on least square miss the significant differences across borrowers in this
part of the conditional distribution. However, for housing wealth and first
time buyer status, the effects are fairly similar whether or not we use an
instrumental variable method.
The pattern for the effect of housing wealth on the interest rate spread is
intuitive. There is essentially no effect from having a higher level of initial
wealth for lower quantiles. However, for the higher “riskier” quantiles higher
housing wealth yields a lower interest rate. This makes sense if greater wealth
provides a collateral cushion which the lender prices into his risk assessment.
According to the QR method, income is of little relevance for loan pricing
over the entire conditional distribution. The IV estimator, however, reveals a
quite different picture for households above the 30th percentile where a higher
real income contributes significantly to lower the borrowing rate conditional
on covariates. The slope associated with mortgagors in the 0.9 quantile, for
instance, is three times larger (in absolute value) than the slope of the median
12In a similar class of models, Chesher (2005) shows that when instruments are only
effective over a limited quantile range, then average effects are likely not to be identified.
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household. This makes sense if higher incomes matter most when borrowers
are riskier.
A comparison between figures 6 and 7 highlights that the endogeneity of
loan size generates an appreciable downward bias in the coefficient on loan
size and a noticeable upward bias on the coefficient on income at the upper
end of the conditional interest rate distribution. Interpreting the downward
bias on loan, we should expect the fact that a higher interest rate will dis-
courage borrowing to imply less sensitivity of the interest rate to loan size
when the latter is treated as exogenous. The finding on income reflects the
fact that income is an important driver of loan size as well as important in
assessing default risk. The effect that we document in figure 7 reflects the
fact that the estimates of aL(τ) based on (5) when loan size is treated as
exogenous are contaminated by the effects of the demand-driven component
of loan.
For age, the QR estimates appear to be downward biased. According to
both the QR and IVQR methods, the age of an individual paying a higher
conditional interest rate spread is significantly more important for her/his
borrowing rate than the age of an individual paying a lower spread. Thus,
lenders do appear to penalize higher risk older borrowers, controlling for
other observable characteristics.
For first time buyers there is little evidence of heterogeneity. While there
is a downward slope at the highest quantiles, the results are imprecisely
estimated. Even at the 90th percentile, however, the magnitude of the
coefficient seems too small for the first time buyer status to be of great
economic significance.
5.3 Regional features
Turning to the effects of regional characteristics on mortgage conditions, fig-
ure 8 reports the coefficient on real house price and claimant count rate across
quantiles for the different methods of estimation. Borrowers in regions char-
acterized by higher house prices enjoy, on average, better price conditions.
The QR estimates do not seem to indicate a clear pattern across house-
hold whereas the IVQR estimates suggest the effect is significantly larger for
mortgagors charged higher interest rates conditional on covariates. Regional
unemployment in contrast appears of little economic and statistical signifi-
cance, and no systematic differences emerge between estimates using the QR
and IVQR methods.
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6 Conclusions
The issue of how far lenders price in risk has become more salient during
the recent turbulence in financial markets. And there has been much dis-
cussion of risk pricing models and their adequacy. While this paper cannot
say whether lenders have been sufficiently prudent in their risk pricing, it
is informative in documenting the historic practices in the U.K. mortgage
market. To do so, we have exploited a sizeable micro-data set on mortgage
contracts. It is natural to approach this issue using a framework which
takes risk heterogeneity seriously. However, it is also important to consider
the implications of loan being endogenous. We proposed using taxation of
housing transactions as an instrument for loan size.
Our results suggest that the credit supply function that individuals face is
upward sloping – larger loans mean larger interest rates. However, the supply
function is highly heterogeneous and depends on borrower characteristics and
macro conditions. Higher income individuals and those with more housing
wealth are by and large better treated, although this has most bite in the
higher risk groups.
Taken together, the empirical results confirm the importance of taking
seriously concerns about heterogeneity and endogeneity in this context. The
results underline the importance of looking at non-linearities in a customer
market like mortgages where individual characteristics matter.
Endogeneity bias also appears to be important but in a somewhat subtle
way. It appears to be rather unimportant for safer borrowers. However, the
results suggests a more exaggerated response of lenders to high risk borrowers
demanding higher loans when loan size is treated as endogenous. Our results
suggest that the U.K. mortgage market has actively priced risk for high
loan borrowers through the period in question, which explains why we see a
pronounced dispersion in the rates paid by borrowers.
A number of issues for further research suggest themselves. One par-
ticularly interesting issue is to focus more on the time-varying nature of the
relationships that we have studied. A concern prior to the current financial
crisis was that lenders lost control of risk pricing due to either failure to per-
ceive risk or a changing in pricing methods. They have since responded by
increasing spreads once again. Accounting for the dynamic factors, partic-
ularly the impact of competition and market liberalization, is an interesting
topic for further research.
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Figure 1: Data Statistics: Kernel Density Functions
Kernel density based on epanechnikov kernel function using the width which would minimize the mean
integrated squared error under Gaussian data. For each variable, the figure reports the deviations from
the annual average over the annual average
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Figure 2: Piece-wise Linear Structure of Stamp Duty Tax Rates
The figure shows the piece-wise linear structure of stamp duty tax for housing transactions in the U.K.
across four time periods selected from Table 1.
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Figure 3: Histogram of Stamp Duty Tax Rates
The figure shows the proportion of borrowers in our dataset that are liable for each rate band of stamp
duty taxation as reported in Table 2.
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Figure 4: Regional real house prices and claimant count
The figure shows time series for real house prices and the claimant count unemployment rate for each
region within our dataset.
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Figure 5: Estimates of the Effect of Loan Size on Individuals’ Inter-
est Rate Spread conditional on Covariates - by quantile
The figure shows the coefficient on real loan from regressions of individual interest rate spread on real loan,
real income, initial real wealth, age, first time buyer dummy, regional house price, regional claimant count,
year and region-specific dummies. Regional house price and claimant count data are lagged one quarter.
QR (LS) estimates in black (blue) refer to quantile (least squares) regressions. Shaded areas (dotted lines)
are 95% confidence intervals estimated using robust standard errors. Estimates are reported for τ ² [0.05,
0.95] at 0.05 unit intervals.
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Figure 6: Estimates of the Effect of Loan Size (Instrumented) on
Individuals’ Interest Rate Spread conditional on Covariates - by
quantile
Coefficients on loan size from instrumental variable regressions of individual interest rate spread on real
loan, real income, initial real wealth, age, first time buyer dummy, regional real house price, regional
claimant count, year and region-specific dummies. The instrument for individual loan is individual stamp
duty rate. IVQR (TSLS) estimates in black (blue) refer to quantile (two stage least squares) regressions.
Shaded areas (dotted lines) are 95% confidence intervals estimated using robust standard errors. QR
estimates from Figure 1 are reported as red line with asterisks. Estimates are reported for τ ² [0.05, 0.95]
at 0.05 unit intervals.
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Figure 7: Estimates of the Effect of Borrowers’ Specific Variables
on Individuals’ Interest Rate Spread conditional on Covariates -
by quantile
Coefficients on borrower-specific variables (real income, initial real wealth, age, and first time buyer status)
from instrumental variable regressions of individual interest rate spread on real loan, real income, initial
real wealth, age, first time buyer dummy, regional real house price, regional claimant count, year and
region-specific dummies. The instrument for individual loan is individual stamp duty rate. IVQR (TSLS)
estimates in black (blue) refer to quantile (two stage least squares) regressions. Shaded areas (dotted
lines) are 95% confidence intervals estimated using robust standard errors. QR estimates are reported as
red line with asterisks. Estimates are reported for τ ² [0.05, 0.95] at 0.05 unit intervals.
25
Figure 8: Estimates of the Effect of Region Specific Variables on
Individuals’ Interest Rate Spread conditional on Covariates - by
quantile
Coefficients on region-specific variables of house prices and claimant count rate from instrumental variable
regressions of individual interest rate spread on real loan, real income, initial real wealth, age, first time
buyer dummy, regional real house price, regional claimant count, year and region-specific dummies. The
instrument for individual loan is individual stamp duty rate. IVQR (TSLS) estimates in black (blue) refer
to quantile (two stage least squares) regressions. Shaded areas (dotted lines) are 95% confidence intervals
estimated using robust standard errors. QR estimates are reported as red line with asterisks. Estimates
are reported for τ ² [0.05, 0.95] at 0.05 unit intervals.
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Table 2: Disaggregated Data on Key Variables
VARIABLE Mean Median St.dev. Skew. Coeff.
of var.
INTEREST RATE SPREAD
1975-1985 4.13 4.25 1.27 -0.74 0.31
1986-1995 1.34 1.37 0.70 0.36 0.52
1996-2005 1.20 1.01 0.84 0.60 0.70
Full Sample 2.41 1.70 1.71 0.55 0.71
REAL LOAN £000s
1975-1985 21.81 20.93 8.67 1.14 0.40
1986-1995 32.63 29.01 18.09 3.30 0.55
1996-2005 44.71 36.74 30.67 2.91 0.69
Full Sample 31.02 26.05 20.97 3.79 0.68
REAL INCOME £000s
1975-1985 11.98 10.92 5.40 2.49 0.45
1986-1995 15.13 13.25 8.79 4.31 0.58
1996-2005 19.06 15.58 14.05 4.67 0.74
Full Sample 14.76 12.50 9.60 5.28 0.65
REAL HOUSE VALUE £000s
1975-1985 33.19 29.05 17.42 2.20 0.52
1986-1995 45.40 38.29 29.55 3.48 0.65
1996-2005 62.45 49.15 46.27 2.78 0.74
Full Sample 44.35 35.44 32.42 3.63 0.73
LOAN TO INCOME RATIO
1975-1985 1.92 1.91 0.57 0.32 0.30
1986-1995 2.27 2.26 0.71 0.94 0.31
1996-2005 2.50 2.47 0.90 1.03 0.36
Full Sample 2.18 2.14 0.75 1.06 0.34
LOAN TO VALUE RATIO
1975-1985 0.72 0.77 0.21 -0.57 0.30
1986-1995 0.78 0.86 0.21 -0.93 0.27
1996-2005 0.77 0.85 0.21 -1.01 0.27
Full Sample 0.75 0.82 0.21 -0.78 0.28
Notes: Individual housing contract data are from the 1975-2005 (excluding 1978) waves of the Survey
of Mortgage Lenders (SML) and its predecessors. The selected sub-sample includes all households
within each wave whose observation is identified as being for house purchase. The interest rate spread
reflects the spread between individuals contracted rate of interest and benchmark funding rates
(the average deposit rate reported by Building Societies). Age reflects the age of the first named
(main) borrower on the mortgage contract. Stamp duty is imputed for each individual from the
prevailing regulations given recorded nominal transaction prices. Real values are computed through
deflating nominal values by monthly observations of the Retail Price Index excluding mortgage
interest payments (RPIX) with all amounts reported in January 1987 £. Coefficient of variation
represents St.dev
Mean
. Sample sizes: 1975-1985=256,154, 1986-1995=246,444, 1996-2005=143,472.
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Table 3: FIRST STAGE REGRESSION
VARIABLES Baseline Collapsed Full Sample
STAMP DUTY RATE 0.229*** 0.065*** 0.207***
(0.001) (0.023) (0.001)
AGE -0.009*** -0.016*** -0.009***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
REAL INCOME 0.600*** 0.804*** 0.602***
(0.001) (0.063) (0.001)
REAL WEALTH -0.009*** 0.019*** -0.009***
(0.000) (0.008) (0.000)
FTB DUMMY 0.015*** 0.135*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.048) (0.001)
REAL REGIONAL HOUSE PRICE 0.276*** 0.205*** 0.289***
(0.004 ) (0.037) (0.003)
REGIONAL CLAIMANT COUNT 0.002*** -0.007*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Observations 564551 360 646070
R2 0.749 0.996 0.737
F-test for the insignificance of stamp duty rate
F(1,564403)=62823 F(1, 312) =8.05 F(1,646022)=65444
Prob>F = 0.00 Prob>F =0.005 Prob>F =0.00
F-test for the null of joint insignificance of the regional dummies
F(11,564403)=384 F(12, 312)=13.3 F(11,646022)=437
Prob>F = 0.00 Prob>F=0.00 Prob>F =0.00
F-test for the null of joint insignificance of the year dummies
F(29,564403)=2241 F(28, 312)=37.6 F(29,646022)=2546
Prob>F = 0.00 Prob>F=0.00 Prob>F =0.00
Notes: see section 2 and Table 2 for sample and data description. The table reports the estimates from
a regression of the log of real loan size on the reported variables and controls for years and regions. Real
values are in 000s of January 1987 pounds. The Baseline column refers to the sample which excludes house
buyers within +/-5% (by value) around the stamp duty thresholds. The Collapsed column refers to the
sample which collapses the data by regions and years. The Full Sample column refers to the sample which
places no restrictions on the distance from the stamp duty threshold values. Standard errors are reported
in parenthesis. *** = p-value <0.01, ** = p-value <0.05, * = p-value <0.1,
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Appendix A: Institutions
In this appendix, we briefly set out some of the measures of financial and
mortgage market developments since the late 1970s. In table A1 we highlight
liberalisation measures affecting the U.K. mortgage market. For example, in
1979 exchange controls were removed exposing the U.K. banking sector to
greater foreign competition but also providing them with access to Eurodol-
lar funding markets. In 1980, the Supplementary Special Deposit Scheme
(the ‘Corset’) was removed. The Corset had introduced penalties (the re-
quirement to hold non-interest bearing deposits) to limit the rate of growth
of banks’ balance sheets and so inflationary pressures. With the removal of
exchange controls, domestic controls on banks balance sheet growth was ren-
dered obsolete as customers could now borrow from abroad and banks were
able to develop new areas of business, such as mortgage lending, and were
able to compete for retail funds.
Table A1: MARKET LIBERALISATION
Date Liberalisation Measure
1979 Removal of Exchange Controls
1980 Removal of Supplementary Deposit Scheme
1981 BSA Recommended Rate becomes advisory
1983 Changes to Building Society Tax Position
1984 BSA Recommended Rate removed
1986 The Building Societies Act (1986)
1988 Raising of Building Societies Wholesale Funding Limit to 40%
Basel I Accords on capital adequacy give mortgage loans lower
1991 Building Society Commission Increased Prudential Advice
1994 Raising of Building Societies Wholesale Funding Limit to 50%
1997 Amendment of the Building Societies Act (1986) takes permissive approach
2007 Building Societies (Funding) and Mutual Societies (Transfers) Act 2007
increases wholesale funding limit to 75
Table A1 indicates some of the major market legislative changes that have impacted upon
the workings of the UK mortgage market.
A provision of the Building Societies Act (1986) was to allow Building So-
cieties to convert to p.l.c. status, and so escape limits that remained prevent-
ing commercial lending or unsecured lending above limits, and give access to
other forms of capital that would allow more rapid expansion/diversification.
In the period since, there have been a range of major demutualisations; from
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Abbey National in 1989, to Northern Rock, Alliance and Leicester, Wool-
wich, Bradford and Bingley during the 1990s (table A2).
Table A2: DEMUTUALISATIONS
Institution Date Current Status Latest Change
Abbey National 1989 Subsidiary of Santander 2004
Converted to plc
Cheltenham and Gloucester 1994 Subsidary of Lloyds Banking Group 1994
Takeover by Lloyds TSB
National and Provincial 1995 Name not in use
Takeover by Abbey National
Alliance and Leicester 1997 Subsidary of Santander 2008
Converted to plc
Bristol and West 1997 Subsidary of Bank of Ireland 1997
Takeover by Bank of Ireland
Halifax 1997 Subsidary of Lloyds Banking Group 2009
Converted to plc
Northern Rock 1997 Nationalised 2008
Converted to plc
The Woolwich 1997 Subsidary of Barclays 2000
Converted to plc
Birmingham Midshires 1999 Subsidary of Lloyds Banking Group 1999
Takeover by Halifax
Bradford and Bingley 2000 Nationalised 2008
Converted to plc
One of the impacts of The Building Societies Act (1986) was to permit Building Societies to demutualise.
Information in Table A2 indicates major demutualisations and the current status of these institutions.
One of the new sources of funding that would be heavily exploited by sev-
eral of these former Building Societies was the issuance of Mortgage Backed
Securities (MBS). Mortgage securitisation emerged in the UK during the late
1980s with the first centralised mortgage lenders. However, it was not until
the late 1990s the UK residential mortgage backed securities (MBS) market
experienced rapid growth with the participation of many major banks and
building societies.
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Appendix B: Dataset Restrictions
In this appendix, we report restrictions placed upon the raw data from which
we obtain our results. Our mortgage origination data covers the period 1975
to 2005, and comes from the Survey of Mortgage Lenders and its predecessor,
the 5% Sample Survey of Mortgages (SBSM). These surveys are available in
electronic format for the years 1975-2001 from the Data Archive at the Uni-
versity of Essex. Unfortunately, the year 1978 is missing. Data covering the
period 2002 to 2005 was obtained by the Bank of England from the Coun-
cil of Mortgage Lenders (CML). To obtain our dataset we supplement data
from the SBSM/SML on loan size, property value, gross interest rate, age,
income and first time buyer status with regional house price data from the
Nationwide house price index, and regional claimant count unemployment
rate data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS). Further, we include
the Building Societies Associations’ recommended deposit rate as our fund-
ing cost prior to 1985, and the average building society gross deposit rate
from the ONS subsequently.
The following restrictions were also placed upon the data to construct our
dataset:
1. discard individuals over the age of 75 and under 21.
2. omit individuals buying a house with a price discount and who were pre-
viously local authority or housing association tenants.
3. exclude sitting tenants not covered by restriction 2.
4. omit observations for individuals with outlying loan-to-value(LTV) and
loan-to-income (LTI) ratios. The threshold levels chosen were LTI>=10, and
LTV<0.2 or LTV>1.1
5. discard observations where lending is not for house purchase (further ad-
vances and remortgaging activity).
6. discard observations with a gross interest rate below 0.5.
7. omit observations where relevant data are missing.
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Appendix C: A micro-foundation for the mort-
gage pricing equation
We seek the simplest model of mortgage pricing which allows for the pos-
sibility of default. Consider a mortgage contract of length T with regular
repayment dates t = 1, ..., T . The lender makes an advance of L . The bor-
rower makes a fixed repayment of m in each period of the mortgage contract.
This mortgage contract is fully characterized by the triple: {m,L, T}.
The probability of continuing to pay in period t, which we assume to
depend on m, is β (m,u) where u is index of riskiness. We assume that
βm (m,u) < 0, so that a higher repayment increases the chances that a
borrower will default. We also assume that βu (m,u) < 0. In the event
of default, we assume that the lender recovers a fraction α of the remaining
payments due under the contract. This reflects the extent of any lien on
future earnings and/or the recovery of losses through collateral.
Let
γ = Γ (m,u) = β (m,u) + (1− β (m,u))α (8)
with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 be the lender’s expected recovery rate. We can think of γ
as encapsulating the borrower’s type in terms of riskiness.
On this basis, the expected revenues under the contract from time t for-
ward are denoted by pit whose evolution follows a difference equation:
pit = γ [m+ pit+1]
Solving this and using the boundary condition piT+1 = 0 yields:
pit = m
γ
1− γ
[
1− γ
−t
γ−T−1
]
. (9)
As we would expect, this is a decreasing function of t since the time remaining
on the mortgage is smaller.
Now for y ∈ R+, define the function:
ψ (y;T ) =
y
1− y
[
y−T − 1
y−T
]
This is an increasing function of y with ψ (1;T ) = T and ψ (0;T ) = 0. When
pricing the mortgage at inception, a lender cares about the expected revenues
viewed from period one forward. Using (9), this is given by:
pi1 = ψ (γ;T )m (10)
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where ψ (γ;T ) ≤ T .
The lender compares the period one expected revenues with the opportu-
nity cost of making a loan advance of L. Suppose that the lender’s funding
interest rate is ρ. Then this opportunity cost over T periods is (1 + ρ)T L.
Using (10) and this observation, we conclude that, for a loan to be viable in
a loan market with funding rate ρ, the fixed per-period repayment of a type
γ borrower who borrows L must solve:
m (L, u)
L
=
(1 + ρ)T
ψ (Γ (m (L, u) , u) ;T )
. (11)
using (8).13 The left hand side of (11) is the proportion of the loan that
must be paid off during each period.
Two things are immediate from (11). First, for Γ (m,u) = 1, equation
(11) collapses to:
m (L, u)
L
=
(1 + ρ)T
T
in which case the borrower faces a fixed payment based on the opportunity
cost of funds paid by the lender and pays this over T years. If Γ (m,u) < 1,
then:
m (L, u)
L
>
(1 + ρ)T
T
.
We can interpret 1/ψ (Γ (m (L, u) , u) ;T ) ≥ 1/T as a “markup” over funding
costs which is increasing in L. This markup is higher if either α or β (m,u)
is lower (which is the case for higher u). Thus, borrowers with worse default
probabilities and lower recovery rates will face a larger markup to compensate
for risk. It is “as if” the lender compensates for the risk of default by charging
a payment as there is a shorter term of the mortgage. To get a “back-of-the-
envelope” feel for this, suppose that β is 0.98, i.e. a 2% default probability
and α is 0.8 (80%), then ψ (γ; 25) ≈ 23.7 so the lender sets a repayment rate
13We are implicitly assuming a competitive credit market. However, we could also
introduce a mark-up factor Λ > 1 such that
m (L, u)
L
= Λ
(1 + ρ)T
ψ (Γ (m (L, u) , u) ;T )
.
This could be time-varying in the empirical analysis to reflect changes in the mortgage
market such as market liberalization. Its variation would then be absorbed in the year
dummy variables.
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as if the borrower was to repay the mortgage in 23.7 years as compensation
for risk.
Second, it is also straightforward to see from (11) that m (L, u) /L is
increasing in L for all u. To see this, observe that if L increases and the
ratio on the right hand side of (11) remains fixed, then m (L, u) must rise
proportionately. However, since m is now higher, the right hand side of (11)
is higher. This is because the markup has to rise to compensate for the
increased risk (since β (m,u) is lower). Thus m (L, u) /L must be higher.
To generate a prediction for the interest rate r (L, u), observe that the
interest rate implicit in the repayment function m (L; x, u) is defined by:
m (L, u) = L
(1 + r (L, u))T
T
, (12)
i.e. as the interest rate that generates a stream of payments m (L, u) over
the contract term without default. This will be the contractual interest rate
in a T period mortgage and is what we observe in the data. Equation (12)
can be solved to yield:
r (L, u) =
(
m (L, u)T
L
) 1
T
− 1 = (1 + ρ)
[
T
ψ (Γ (m (L, u) , u) ;T )T
] 1
T
− 1
= (1 + ρ)λ (L, u)− 1 ≥ ρ (13)
where λ (L, u) ≥ 1 is increasing in L and u.
Equation (13) makes clear why we expect the slope of the inverse credit
supply function to be non-linear. Thus we have
R (L, u) = r (L, u)− ρ = (1 + ρ) [λ (L, u)− 1] (14)
where, as in the empirical model that we proposed, the variable u can be
thought of the source of unobserved heterogeneity.
35
